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The Perils of Race and Gender 
World of Legal Abstraction 
• In a 
By CATHARINE PIERCE WELLS* 
ON MY DESK at school is a picture of Stephanie Wildman and me 
and our shared friend, Trina Grillo. It was taken at Stephanie's 
house several months before Trina died. The picture is there to re-
mind me of who I am-both inside and outside the classroom. As an 
individual, my experience and judgment are profoundly affected by 
my own particular set of needs, desires, and aspirations. Yet, despite 
my normally clear understanding of this particular truth, I often find 
myself becoming someone else when I enter the classroom. I forget 
that I am an individual person with a unique set of attitudes, beliefs, 
and desires. Instead, I begin to think of myself as a more generic per-
son, devoid of idiosyncrasy and able to speak from a place of universal 
truth and monolithic common sense. For example, I refer to justice as 
an abstract noun rather than acknowledge my feelings of fairness may 
or may not coincide with those of my students. My tendency in this 
regard is not surprising. I work in a profession that places a high value 
on abstract formulations, while heavily discounting individual feelings 
and experience. 
During the period from 1992 to 1995, Stephanie, Trina, and I 
made a joint commitment to bring issues of race and gender! into our 
traditional first-year classes. The idea was not simply to "add" them on 
to other issues but to weave them into a critical understanding of the 
meaning of law in contemporary society. To do this, we had to resist 
the temptation to leave our individual selves behind. Race and gender 
construct radically different perspectives, and we could hardly expect 
to do justice to these issues without acknowledging the limitations of 
our own individual viewpoints. This was difficult for two reasons. First, 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I am especially grateful to my 
research assistant, Jennifer Burke, for her many contributions to this article. 
l. For convenience, I speak of "race and gender" when I mean to refer to other 
polarizing differences as well. This locution is a compromise between two difficulties. On 
the one hand, it would be wrong to suggest that race and gender are the only societal 
hierarchies. On the other, using the abstract terminology of "human differences" seems to 
dissipate the realities of oppression into the more genial realm of social anthropology. 
523 
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as teachers, we became more exposed-our individual selves could no 
longer hide behind abstract nouns and the societal "we." Second, and 
more importantly, it deprived many of our students of the safety they 
felt when they embraced the illusion that we live in a world of shared 
experience and unanimous judgment. Despite the discomfort, how-
ever, we felt we were confronting something important; we felt we 
were attending to the most central task of legal education. 
Law rests upon many "shared" assumptions. An important aspect 
of traditional first-year teac~ing is not only to make those assumptions 
explicit but to raise questions about them. To learn the law, students 
must fully explore the relationship between these "shared" assump-
tions and the adequacy of legal decision-making. Sometimes, ques-
tioning these assumptions generates no special difficulties. For 
example, students can readily grasp and apply arguments that are 
framed in terms of economic efficiency. Further, it is not hard for 
them to see that the assumptions that underlie economic analysis are 
open to some widely understood objections. But when we talk about 
race and gender, we do not always share the same basic assumptions. 
Nor do we find it easy to discuss our differences. For example, it is a 
fact that many of the women in a criminal law class worry about being 
raped, while many of the men worry about being falsely accused of 
rape. White men tend to worry about it in the context of date rape, 
while black men tend to worry about it more generally. Thus, a discus-
sion of the issues involved in a rape prosecution inevitably raises a 
need to acknowledge individual students are differently situated with 
respect to key issues. As teachers, we have a choice-we can either 
sidestep these differences by becoming abstract and impersonal, or we 
can face them head on. Facing the differences risks polarizing the 
class and stirring up feelings of anger and frustration, resulting in dis-
cussions that are difficult to manage and control. While some students 
are comfortable with these discussions, many others find them diffi-
cult and threatening. Sometimes the pressure to avoid them is in-
tense, but this avoidance comes at a price. Suppression of real 
differences between groups inevitably marginalizes2 those who are not 
2. "Marginalizing" was a term commonly used by feminists to refer to an ongoing 
process whereby the concerns of men are centralized and the concerns of women are 
dispersed to the margins of conscious attention. When I started discussing this classroom 
dynamic with some of my African-American students, I discovered they used the term "per-
ipheralize" to refer to a similar phenomenon that they experience in discussions of racial 
difference. 
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members of the dominant group.3 It also deprives those in the domi-
nant group the opportunity to acquire a deeper, more inclusive view 
of the issues. Stephanie and Trina understood this and, despite the 
difficulties, were always steadfast about the need to undertake a full 
exploration of perspectival differences. 
Since those days, the University of San Francisco Law School has 
lost both of these gifted teachers. Trina died in July of 1995,4 and 
Stephanie retired in 1999; this essay is for Stephanie. It is based on a 
presentation that I made at the 1998 Society of American Law Teach-
ers ("SALT") Teaching Conference. The assignment was not easy: I 
was asked to talk about "big and little murders"5-the personal and 
professional difficulties that confront "progressive"6 law teachers. The 
assignment was difficult because I was asked both to discuss these 
murders without minimizing them and at the same time to say some-
thing upbeat-or at least "not too depressing"-about our shared as-
pirations. In preparing this speech, I often thought about Stephanie 
and about the matter-of-fact way in which she describes the i~uries of 
difference. In her book, Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preferences Un-
dermine America,7 she has helped us all to see the inevitable link be-
tween privilege and oppression. It is not enough, she eloquently 
reminds us, simply to avoid acts that overtly oppress others. We must 
also examine the dominant group privileges we ourselves hold, and 
we must be willing to deploy them in the service of active resistance. 
3. See generally Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreward: Toward a Race-Conscious 
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 1 (1989), reprinted in American Association of 
Law Schools Symposium: Bringing Values and Perspectives Back into the Law School Classroom: 
Practicalldeasfor Teachers, 4 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 33 (1994) (explaining the way 
in which the overly simplistic treatments of race and class issues marginalize "minority" 
students") . 
4. My earlier essay about Trina is one of a number of such writings. My essay-The 
Theory and Practice of Being Trina: A Remembrance of Trina Grillo-is contained in the Minne-
sota volume that is dedicated to her memory. See 81 MINN. L. REv. 1381 (1997). Other 
essays appeared in an earlier volume of this law review. See Symposium, In Honor of Professar 
Trina Grillo: Legal Education far A Diverse Warld, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 731 (1997). 
5. I believe the conference organizers meant the term "murders" to describe the 
kind of psychological assault that Patricia Williams describes in· Spirit-Murdering the Messen-
ger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127 
(1987). 
6. SALT's use of "progressive" in this context is interesting. For the purposes of this 
panel, it seemed to be a way of referring to men and women of color and white women, 
without excluding white men who wished to align themselves with the "outsider" perspec-
tive. I am sympathetic to this usage of the term, but think its historical association with all 
white, and often elitist, movements is a little unfortunate. 
7. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). 
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For those of us who are white, educated, and not poor, the goal of 
resistance is easy to forget and hard to achieve. Stephanie is one of the 
people in my life who helps me to remember. Stephanie's gift to all of 
us is that she inspires hope while challenging complacency. 
Big and Little Murders8 
My job on this panel is to speak about the professional and per-
sonal difficulties that confront "progressive"9 law teachers. Largely, 
this is a story about racism and sexism in the world of legal education. 
I have been assigned the title "Big and Little Murders," which I believe 
is a reference to the kind of daily demoralization that Patricia Wil-
liams describes in Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of 
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism. IO While I cannot match 
Williams' eloquence and insight, I will try to further the discussion in 
two ways. First, I will add to her description of the problem by pulling 
together some of the information that is already in the law reviews 
about the treatment of women and minorities in legal education. Sec-
ond, since the organizers have asked me to be "upbeat," I will also talk 
about survival. I will share my belief that our spirits are strong and my 
hope that we can learn to live despite the spirit-murdering messages 
that pervade our daily lives. 
Let me begin by describing some of what I found "in the litera-
ture" about the problem of spirit murder. Last summer, in the context 
of thinking about affirmative action, I asked my research assistant to 
look for all the law review articles that talked about the realities of 
discrimination in law school hiring and retention. The search was in-
credibly fruitful. There were studies of various types. 11 There were also 
8. Catharine Pierce Wells, speech entitled Plenary One at the 1998 SALT Conference, 
Loyola University (Oct. 16, 1998). 
9. See supra discussion note 7. 
10. See supra discussion note 6. 
11. There are studies about the experience of female and minority faculty in law 
schools. See generally Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on 
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988); Donna Fossum, Women Law 
Professors, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 903 (1980); Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, 
Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. 
L. REV. 199 (1997); Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical 
Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2299 
(1992); Carl Tobias, Engendering Law Faculties, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143 (1990); Martha S. 
West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. 
REV. 67 (1994); Elyce H. Zenoff & Kathryn V. Lorio, What We Know, What We Think We 
Know, and What We Don't Know About Women Law Professors, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 869 (1984). 
There are also a number of studies that look at the experiences of female and minority 
students in law schools. See generally 1996 AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION COMMISSION ON Wo-
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detailed and thoughtful descriptions of the daily obstacles that con-
front women and minority faculty.12 There were even several law re-
view symposia dealing with the topic.13 The depth and breadth of this 
literature was stunning. Equally stunning was the story of human suf-
fering that emerged from its pages. 
Since the organizers have asked me to be "upbeat," I will not 
dwell on the depressing statistics or the distressing personal stories. If 
anyone doubts the existence of real discrimination and oppression in 
legal education, I urge them to spend a day or two reading the articles 
I have cited. For now, however, I will limit myself to a few. 
Let us consider, for example, the difference between popular 
(white) perception and reality when it comes to the plight of women 
of color. Many of you will remember that in the 1970s people would 
often talk about "two-fers." The phrase suggested that you would be 
particularly desirable in the job market if you were both a woman and 
a minority. Since you would then be entitled to a "double dose" of 
affirmative action, the job offers were supposed to come rolling in. 
But, as most of us know, this was not the reality. For example, one 
study shows that: 
[M]inority women who joined law school faculties during this pe-
riod began teaching at significantly lower ranks than the minority 
MEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQuALITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCA· 
TION (1996); Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Academy, 8 
YALE j.L. & FEMINISM 333 (1996); Paula Gaber, Just Trying to Be Human in This Place: The 
Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10 YALE j.L. & FEMINISM 165 (1998); Lani Guinier et aI., 
Becoming Gentlemen: Women's .experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(1994); Cheryl M. Herden, Women in Legal Education: A Feminist Analysis of Law School, 63 
REViSTAJURlDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 551 (1994); Scott N. Ihrig, Sexual Orientation 
in Law School: Experiences of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Law Students, 14 LAw & INEQ. J. 555 
(1995); Jean c. Love, Twenty Questions on the Status of Women Students in Your Law Schoo~ 11 
WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 405 (1997). 
12. See, e.g., Okianer Christian Dark, Just My 'Magination, 10 fuRV. BLACKLETTERj. 21 
passim (1993) (describing a variety of demeaning and demoralizing instances of racial hos-
tility and insensitivity); Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisi-
bility and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REv. 901 passim (1997) (describing 
difficulties of effectively dealing with race and gender issues when teaching); Ann E. Freed-
man, Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism and Homophobia in Law 
Schoo~ 24 GA. L. REv. 849 (1990) (describing how students updermine authority by behav-
ing disrespectfully). 
13. See Academic Freedom and Tenure Symposium, 15 PACE L. REv. 1 (1994); Symposium, 
Critical Race Perspectives for the New Millennium-Second Annual Northeastern People of Color 
Legal Scholarship Conference, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 705 (1997); Symposium, In Your Midst: 
Contributions of Women of Color in the Law, 28 HARv. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 259 (1993); Symposium 
on Civic and Legal Education: Panel Five: Ethics, Values, and Diversity in the Legal Academy, 45 
STAN. L. REv. 1885 (1993); Symposium, The Voices of Women: A Symposium on Women in Legal 
Education, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1991). 
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men, obtained positions at significantly less prestigious schools, 
and were significantly more likely to teach low-status courses like 
legal writing or trusts and estates. None of these disparities can be 
adequately explained through differences in credentials, age, work 
experience, geographic constraints, or family ties. Instead, law 
schools seem to treat minority women less favorably than minority 
men in the hiring process.14 
This is not an old study. It was conducted in 1992 at a time when 
many argued that twenty years of affirmative action had finally allowed 
everyone to "catch up." To the contrary, however, the study suggests 
that the most serious problem with affirmative action is that there has 
been so little of it.15 
In addition to simply studying the numbers, some authors have 
tried to "fill in the blanks" about why women and scholars of color 
have not flourished in the academy. In a study conducted by Richard 
Delgado and Derrick BelP6 (the "Bell-Delgado survey"), for example, 
minority law professors were asked: On whom do you rely for institu-
tional news and gossip, and from whom do you seek emotional sup-
port? Their reported responses were suggestive: "[N] 0 one, myself, 
minority or maJority race students, secretaries or the clerical staff."17 
One said: "My long-distance phone bills are extraordinary."18 Several 
said: "I'm usually the last to find out."19 This kind of isolation is an 
obviously important factor. It not only makes it difficult to function in 
tightly-knit law school communities, it also brings frustration, anger, 
and severe loneliness. 
We should also think about the verbal element in discrimination. 
Our mothers used to tell us that "sticks and stones will break our 
bones but words will never hurt us." Most of us have found this is not 
quite true. Words, in fact, can hurt badly when there is a constant 
theme of disparagement and invisibility. We have all been patronized, 
criticized, minimized, overlooked, accused, trivialized, and dehuman-
ized in ways that are both small and large. Richard Delgado uses the 
14. Merritt & Reskin, The Double Minarity, supra note 12, at 2301. 
15. I have heard it said numerous times that some particularly promising white male 
candidate has been told to give up his idea of law teaching because, he is told, law schools 
are not hiring anyone but women and minorities. The numbers clearly indicate that this 
particular piece of advice is not true. 
16. Richard Delgado, Minarity Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Suroey, 24 HARV. 
C.R-C.L. L. REv. 349 (1989). 
17. [d. at 359. 
18. /d. 
19. [d. 
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term "microaggression" to refer to some of these incidents.20 I like 
this term because it seems to recognize that, taken out of context, 
many of the injuries appear small and unnotable. Indeed, microag-
gressions are common in daily life and not entirely limited to race and 
gender. Nevertheless, when they are repeated daily and resonate with 
more serious forms of mistreatment, they can have a very large and 
very negative impact. Let me give you just one example of a series of 
microaggressions at work. The Federalist Society at Rutgers distrib-
uted a newsletter entitled, 2nd Annual International Girls Night Out: 
Bodies in Lotion.21 It was meant as a parody of an actual student-spon-
sored symposium on women's rights.22 The parody, however, was not 
very clever. For example, the students made up a panel called: The 
TOYS-R-US Lecture: Women as Property: How to Get the Most Work Out of 
Your Mail Order Chilean Bride; You Too Can Own Your Own in Fee Simple 
for a Simple Fee. 23 At the risk of sounding humorless, I have to say that 
this does not sound like "good, clean fun" to me. The sexual exploita-
tion of third world women is a real problem and it is one that deeply 
resonates with the experience of many of our women students. Treat-
ing it as a laughing matter is but one way in which those students are 
made to feel unwelcome in the law school environment. 
For this reason, there may be only the slightest exaggeration in 
the use of the phrase "spirit murders." The treatment of Derrick Bell 
at Stanford is one very public example of this phenomenon.24 I would 
suggest, however, that many of the most painful spirit murders are 
private. One example from the Bell-Delgado study25 clearly illustrates 
how conduct can impart a deadly message while remaining unnoticed 
in the wider community. One respondent in the study reported that 
she is the only black woman teaching at a major southern university 
and that, "although she dresses impeccably, visitors to the law school 
often mistake her for a maid and call spills and messes to her atten-
20. See Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have VW!at Mi-
norities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 309 (1987). 
21. See Daniel Wise, Symposium Program Parody Stirs Protest at Rutgers Law School: Dean 
Claims First Amendment Bars Disciplinary Action Against Students, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 30, 1993, at 1. 
22. See id. 
23. [d. 
24. Derrick Bell, a nationally known constitutional scholar, describes the incident this 
way: "Without consulting me, a few faculty members [at Stanford], with some degree of 
approval from the administration, organized a series of 'enrichment lectures' intended to 
supplement coverage of my [Constitutional Law] course." Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain 
of Racial Perspective, STAN. L. SCH. j., May 9, 1986, at 5. Students had complained that his 
course was not traditional enough in that it focused on racial issues. See id. 
25. See Delgado, Minority Law Professors' Lives, supra note 17, at 360. 
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tion."26 At best, these interactions are unpleasant and demeaning. At 
worst, through repetition and resonance,27 they send a powerful 
message of hostility and exclusion. Make no mistake about it-the 
message is a deadly one even though it probably remains unnoticed in 
the wider community. 
What I have recounted here are just a few stories from the lives of 
women and minorities in legal education. There are many, many 
more. I have had my share of them.28 I know that such incidents-
incidents that may seem minor to others-are often devastating to 
me. Yet I am no wimp. In eight years of litigation practice, I cried 
exactly twice. I cried twice that many times in the first week of law 
teaching. Not only have I cried. Incidents like these have rendered me 
speechless at crucial moments; left me in a state of demoralization for 
days and weeks at a time; and made me so angry that I would lie awake 
all night alternating between feelings of helplessness and thoughts of 
revenge. And I am not the only one. I know many women who teach 
law. Many of them look, for all the world, like white, middle class, 
successful women who have it all. They are strong, resourceful, and 
articulate. But sometimes they are so dispirited, depressed, and bone 
tired that they fantasize about violence or contemplate the advantages 
of being a bag lady. This is in contrast to the women I know who have 
succeeded in legal practice. As they come to the peak of their careers, 
they feel increasingly energized and empowered. Perhaps, we should 
ask ourselves: What is it about our profession that makes these kinds 
of incidents so debilitating? Why is it so hard in this particular context to 
simply "rise" above them? We need to consider the possibility that the 
nature of the academic world is at least part of the problem. 
In the world of legal practice there are big and little successes all 
of the time. One wins a motion here; one solves a problem there. 
Perhaps a negotiation goes well; perhaps just the right bit of legal re-
search brings order out of chaos. Even when one loses a case, there is 
26. [d. 
27. The seriousness of this kind of incident grows with repetition and by its resonance 
with her own experience. She believed-I suspect with some justification-that for many 
of her law students, she was the first black woman that they had ever seen "out of [the] 
uniform" of domestic service. [d. 
28. My background has exposed me to many instances of discrimination, tokenism, 
and harassment-not to mention both covert and overt expressions of sexism. I went to 
graduate school in 1969 and to Harvard Law School in 1973. In both places, women were 
under-represented in the student body and entirely absent among the tenured faculty. 
Mter eight years of practice, I entered law teaching in 1984. Even at that late date, I was 
one of the women that Stephanie Wildman describes as accepting a job in legal education 
without fully realizing that we had to integrate the profession before we could work in it. 
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something to learn in the try. By contrast, in the academic world, the 
difference between success and failure is often hard to measure. The 
things that "count" are ephemeral things like peer opinion, student 
opinion, reputation, and national rankings. And it is not just your 
work that is assessed: Judgments about collegiality, accessibility, integ-
rity, fairness, and decency are part of the mix. Such things are subtle: 
They are driven by sound-bites and casual impressions. Therefore, 
success requires a vigilant and strong ego. Unfortunately, however, a 
person who is dispirited or demoralized is unlikely to engage in the 
kind of behavior that leads to positive assessments by others. Thus, 
demoralization leads to a kind of worsening curve where paralysis and 
withdrawal constantly undermine public perception of successful 
performance. 
In this world of fast impressions, it often seems to m'e that if you 
are white and male-but more particularly, if you are conventional in 
your approach and happy with the status quo-then the wind is at 
your back. If you choose, you can walk down a well-defined path to a 
hopeful and cheerful future. Or, in the alternative, you can choose to 
be a maverick and people will praise your originality. On the other 
hand, if you are not white or not male-if your views aren't conven-
tional or you are unhappy with the status quo-then it all seems very 
different. You feel yourself swimming upstream on a river with white-
water rapids and whirling eddies. Perhaps, as you proceed, great walls 
of water slam you into rocks or knock you down into the water. Per-
haps there is thunder and lightening, and you can feel that it is about 
to rain. Worse yet, there are sharks and snakes and even alligators 
(though what they are doing in an inland river, I do not know). To 
those who watch from the safety of the shore, none of this seems to be 
happening, but-in the water where you are-this is what it feels like. 
These feelings are real, but other things are real as well. With 
time, most of us have become stronger and better able to swim against 
the current. Since I am supposed to be upbeat, I have particularly 
tried to think about this latter, more hopeful development. Where 
does it come from? How can we make it a more central part of our 
experience? As I try to answer these questions, I hope no one will 
think that I am saying it is possible to think your way out of oppres-
sion. To the contrary, I believe that the problems I have described are 
mostly unavoidable. On the other hand, I do believe that the human 
spirit is resilient and that it is worthwhile to analyze the process by 
which we can sometimes create and sustain our own positive 
momentum. 
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There are three things, in particular, that I think might be help-
ful. The first is activism-the very thing that this conference is about. 
If we want social change, we need to get out of our classrooms and 
into the world. If we think that Critical Legal Studies is right and that 
the assertion of legal rights is not an effective strategy for social 
change,29 then we need to forget about law reform and do some polit-
ical organizing. And, if we believe that all politics is false conscious-
ness, perhaps we could start a counter-hegemonic soup kitchen. In 
any case, we should not, under any circumstances, allow the purity of 
our theories to interfere with the need for social praxis. 
Second, we need to look more seriously at the kind of communi-
ties that we have not formed. While most of us belong to many profes-
sional groups and organizations, very few of them are truly supportive 
and sustaining. Too often promising attempts at forming such groups 
are thwarted as members find themselves unable to sustain organiza-
tional momentum. In addition, the demands of faithful participation 
are often inconsistent with other institutional responsibilities. 'Ac-
cepting invitations to travel may mean that the individual is unavaila-
ble for staff meetings and other kinds of group interaction. The 
dilemma is this: On the one hand, the value system of the academy 
leads us to seek national recognition. On the other, pursuing these 
career goals is often inconsistent with maintaining our connection to 
local groups. If we are not there when people need us, we do not 
develop the right relationships. And, unfortunately, the problem is 
magnified by the fact that we are all, to some degree, opportunistic 
and self-seeking. If we want to build supportive communities, we must 
learn to place them ahead of the individualism that marks our profes-
sional lives. 
Third, we need to talk more about what is going on inside our-
selves. To use Emma Jordan's words, we need to "recover" from our 
"amnesia."30 She uses these words to describe how hard it was for her 
to tell her own stories of racism and oppression: 
I am a recovering amnesiac. . . . As the days rolled by and the 
publishing deadline loomed, I was finally forced to confront the 
awful truth. I had no ready list of racial insults or injury. Could it 
be that I had somehow moved through 18 years of law teaching 
without a racial scratch? I now recognized that many of my exper-
29. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984) (discussing 
the various critiques of rights that have developed in American legal circles). 
30. See Emma C. Jordan, Nepenthe, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 113, 113 (1990-91). 
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ie'1ces have been simply too painful to recall, and certainly too 
painful to share beyond a small circle of my friends. 31 
533 
Yet, when it comes to race and gender, there has been no 
shortage of storytelling. The problem is that most of the stories have 
. been told in the way that lawyers tell stories. We give a polished pres-
entation of the facts together with just enough spin so that we can tell 
the good guys from the bad guys. Such stories may have their uses. 
They might, for example, help to reform sinners by making them un-
derstand the nature of their sins. For my own part, I am skeptical 
about working on this kind of redemption. I am far more interested in 
the kind of storytelling that heals the teller's soul. To heal, we need to 
tell our stories in the same way they are experienced-that is, with all 
the ambiguity, confusion, and emotion still attached. In the legal liter-
ature, such storytelling is rare, but I found one example that illustrates 
what I mean. In a law review article, Reginald Robinson describes what 
happened when he went into his colleague's office for a professional 
review:32 
When I entered my colleague's office, I was already deeply in pain. 
It was a very rough beginning. I was battle weary, bone tired. And 
when he began to talk, I sank into my pain which embraced me 
with rough, razor sharp arms. As he talked, I sensed that invisible 
cuts would hasten my death. I wondered if he saw my pain. He did 
not. As he continued to talk, I felt small and unsure. He, a liberal 
colleague, told me bluntly that I was "sub par," that my perform-
ance was "unacceptable." What most disturbed me was that he ap-
peared to swagger unsympathetically in his seat. I felt threatened, 
unsupported, and disrespected. As he spouted on arrogantly and 
officiously, I looked at [a] junior female colleague [who was also in 
the room] ... ; I needed a reality check. I wanted some assurance 
that I was not misreading him. I also tried to see if she agreed with 
his outrageous conduct. As I looked at her, she turned her eyes 
away. I was stunned.33 
I think that the lesson we can learn from Emma and Reggie is 
quite clear. We have a lot of experiences that are extremely painful. 
To survive, we often forget. But even when we remember, we remem-
ber at a distance. We fear that our recollections will overwhelm us and 
bring us down. Healing, on the other hand, requires that we reopen 
ourselves to the reality of our own experience. We need to tell these 
stories to one another in safe and private places. The point is not 
merely to process our feelings. We must also do what the Buddhist 
31. [d. at 113. 
32. See Reginald Leaman Robinson, Teachingfrom the Margins: Race as a Pedagogical Sub-
Text, a Critical Essay, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 151, 175-76 (1997). 
33. [d. at 175-76. 
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writer,Joanna Macy, describes as "despair work."34 She developed this 
concept in the context of her work in deep ecology. She asks people 
to explore their feelings of deep distress about the environment.35 
She urges this in the hope that people will respond to their despair 
with action rather than apathy: "The cause of our apathy," she argues, . 
"is not mere indifference. It stems from a fear of confronting the de-
spair that lurks subliminally beneath the tenor of life-as-usual. "36 
Thus, the point of despair work is not to rid ourselves of feeling, but 
to sharpen feelings; to process them to the point where they provide 
reliable feedback about the world.37 However difficult this process 
may be, it is essential to any hope of improvement: 
The refusal to feel takes a heavy toll. Not only is there an impover-
ishment of our emotional and sensory life-flowers are dimmer 
and less fragrant, our loves less ecstatic-but this psychic numbing 
also impedes our capacity to process and respond to information. 
The energy expended in pushing down despair is diverted from 
more creative uses, depleting the resilience and imagination 
needed for fresh visions and strategies. Furthermore, the fear of 
despair can erect an invisible screen, selectively filtering out anxi-
ety-provoking data. In a world where organisms require feedback 
in order to adapt and survive, this is suicidal. . . . Despair cannot 
be banished by injections of optimism or sermons on "positive 
thinking." Like grief, it must be acknowledged and worked 
through. This means it must be named and validated as a healthy, 
normal human response to the situation we find ourselves in.38 
We would do well to undertake a similar task with respect to our 
feelings about oppression and injustice. We need to take a few min-
utes to think about "the despair that lurks subliminally beneath the 
tenor of [our] Ii [ves]-as-usual."39 What makes us cry? What renders us 
speechless? We must probe the depths of our private despair. To re-
move the despair, we must break the silence. We must allow ourselves 
to really feel the suffering we have .already experienced. 
I believe that this process is the beginning of survival. We need to 
attend to our needs and the true circumstances of our lives. We must 
connect with our experiences and with our pain. We must do some 
despair work and take it seriously. We must commit ourselves-really 
commit ourselves-to communities that sustain us. And we must do 
some work-some real lawyering work-in our communities. If we do 
34. JOANNA MAcy, WORLD AS LOVER, WORLD AS SELF 15 (1991). 
35. See id. 
36. Id. at 15. 
37. See id. 15-16. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 15. 
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these things, the despair will not leave us, but it will be joined in our 
experience with hope and with love for what is mysterious and beauti-
ful in the world. 
It took me a long time to confront my despair, but in the end, I 
came to an understanding which really does sustain me. I have come 
to think of political practice as being a kind of spiritual practice. We 
don't do it because it changes the world. We do it because it is an 
expression of our hopes and our yearnings. It calls from the best parts 
of ourselves and summons us to find a hope for the future. We do not 
do it for fame or glory. We do it because it teaches us patience, 
humility, and compassion. In it, we regain a loving relationship with 
the world. I believe that we can transform both ourselves and the 
world when we look for the best in ourselves and for all that is empow-
ering and ennobling in the world. 
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